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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

SEPARATION OF POWERS: EXECUTIVE AND
LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES
By
HON. HERBERT BROWNELL, JR.'

Anyone who has served as legal adviser to the executive branch of the Federal
Government is well aware of the treacherous chasms which lie along the path leading to decisions on constitutional questions. In addition to the formidable challenge
of the legal issues, a host of other considerations intrude upon ultimate advisory
dispositions. Among them, as a Supreme Court Justice dryly observed, is that
"Constitutional adjudications are apt by exposing differences to exacerbate them."'
Responsibilities of office, however, do not afford the refuge of indecision
when judgments are required. A statutory reminder, if one were needed, of the
Attorney General's obligation as to legal advisory service has remained in force
in substantially the same language since 1789: "The Attorney General shall give
his advice and opinion upon questions of law, whenever required by the President". 2 Among the situations which sometimes prompt the President's request
for legal advisory opinions are those which arise through legislative enactments.
It is the purpose of the present writing merely to set forth an opinion recently
given to the President on one provision of the 1956 Defense Department Appropriation Bill which, it seemed to me, raised basic constitutional questions. The
advice given to the President, which is being published as an Attorney General's
opinion, is set forth below. It is self-explanatory:
July 13, 1955

The President,
The White House.
My dear Mr. President:
You have asked for my advice regarding the validity of certain provisions of
H. R. 6042, 84th Congress, first session, the Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1956.
Section 638 of that act reads as follows:
"Sec. 638. No part of the funds appropriated in this Act may be
used for the disposal or transfer by contract or otherwise of work that has
been for a period of three years or more performed by civilian personnel
of the Department of Defense unless justified to the Appropriations
Committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives, at least ninety
days in advance of such disposal or transfer, that its discontinuance is
economically sound and the work is capable of performance by a contractor without danger to the national security: Provided, That no such
* Attorney General of the United States, LL. B. Yale Law School 1927.
1 Frankfurter, J., concurring in Youngstown Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 595 (1952).
2 1 Stat. 92; 19 Stat. 241; 5 U. S. C. § 303.
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disposal or transfer shall be made if disapproved by either committee
within the ninety-day period by written notice to the Secretary of Defense."
The proviso reserves to the Appropriations Committees of the Senate and
House of Representatives the right to disapprove and forbid action by the Secretary of Defense in disposing of or transferring work performed for a period of
three years or more by civilian personnel of the Department of Defense.
The Secretary of Defense is otherwise authorized by law to dispose of or
transfer such work. In pursuance of that authority, the Secretary of Defense would
be permitted to engage in the administration and execution of the law which,
by constitutional warrant, has been the responsibility and right of the executive
branch since the founding of our constitutional form of Government. The indicated provisions of section 638 effectively intrude upon such responsibility and
right.
The practical effect of these provisions is to vest the power to administer the
particular program jointly in the' Secretary of Defense and the members of the
Appropriations Committees, with the overriding right to forbid action reserved to
the two Committees. This, I believe, engrafts executive functions upon legislative
members and thus overreaches the permitted sweep of legislative authority. At
the same time, it serves to usurp power confided to the executive branch. The
result, therefore, is violative of the fundamental constitutional principle of separation of powers prescribed in articles I and II of the Constitution which places
the legislative power in the Congress and the executive power in the executive
branch.
Another aspect of invalidity, of equal force, is presented by the proviso.
Thus, while the Congress may enact legislation governing the making of Government contracts, it may not legally delegate to its committees or members the
power to make contracts, either directly or by conferring upon them power to
disapprove a contract which an officer of the executive branch proposes to make.
Apart from the right of the Congress as a whole with respect to contractual
authority, it is quite dear that committees of the Congress do not have the legal
capacity to enact legislation. Nevertheless, the Appropriations Committees of
the Senate and the House of Representatives have assumed to themselves that power
in the present instance.
The bases for the several foregoing conclusions are, in my judgment, fully
supported by and are consistent with the Constitution of the United States, views
long espoused by past Presidents of the United States, and by opinions of the
judicial branch of our Government. These are briefly set forth below.
Article II of the 'Constitution provides that "The executive Power shall be
vested in a President of the United States of America" (Sec.1) and that "he
shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed" (Sec. 3). Article I of the
Constitution provides that "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested
in a Congress of the United States" (Sec. 1). The division of authority and re-
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sponsibility as among the three branches of our Government was described by
Chief Justice John Marshall early in the Nation's history: "The difference between
the departments undoubtedly is, that the legislature makes, the executive executes, and the judiciary construes the law; ...... 8 Over 100 years later, the
Supreme Court reaffirmed this basic constitutional division between the three
great branches of our Government. In Springer v. Philippine Islands,4 the Court
declared invalid certain acts of the Philippine legislature vesting the voting power
of stock owned by the Government of the Philippines in a committee consisting
of the Governor General, the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives of the Philippine Islands. In its opinion, the Court said:
"Thus the Organic Act for the Philippine Islands," following the
rule established by the American constitutions, both State and Federal,
divides the Government into three separate departments - the legislative,
executive and judicial . . . . And this separation and the consequent
exclusive character of the powers conferred upon each of the three departments is basic and vital - not merely a matter of governmental mechanism ....
"Legislative power, as distinguished from executive power, is the
authority to make laws, but not to enforce them or appoint the agents
charged with the duty of such enforcement. The latter are executive functions...
"Not having the power of appointment, unless expressly granted or
incidental to its powers, the legislature cannot engraft executive duties
upon a legislative office, since that would be to usurp the power of appointment by indirection; though the case might be different if the additional duties were devolved upon an appointee of the executive." 6
This decision has never been qualified by the Supreme Court or by the lower
Federal courts and has generally been followed by State courts dealing with similar
questions. Earlier, the Supreme Court had held that duties which the House of
Representatives attempted to confer upon a committee were judicial in character
6
and not susceptible of exercise by the legislative department.
The present proviso cannot be sustained on the theory that it is a proper
condition attached to an appropriation. It is recognized that the Congress may
grant or withhold appropriations as it chooses, and when making an appropriation
may direct the purposes to which the appropriation shall be devoted. It may also
impose conditions with respect to the use of the appropriation, provided always
that the conditions do not require operation of the Government in a way forbidden
by the Constitution. If the practice of attaching invalid conditions to legislative
enactments were permissible, it is evident that the constitutional system of the
separability of the branches of Government would be placed in the gravest
jeopardy.
3
4
5
6

Wayman v. Southard, 23 U. S. 1, 44 (1825).
277 U. S. 189 (1928).
Id. at 201, 202.
Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168 (1880).
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Since the organization of the Government, Presidents have felt bound to
insist upon the maintenance of the executive functions unimpaired by legislative
encroachment, just as the legislative branch has felt bound to resist interferences
with its power by the executive. To acquiesce in legislation encroaching upon
the executive authority results in the establishment of dangerous precedents. The
first Presidential defense of the integrity of the powers of the Executive under
the Constitution was made by Washington when the House of Representatives
insisted on being recognized as part of the treaty-making power. In his message
to the House of Representatives of March 30, 1796, he said:
"It is essential to the due administration of the Government that
the boundaries fixed by the 'Constitution between the different departments should be preserved: ....- 7
From that day to this the Presidents have almost unvaryingly felt compelled to
resist interferences with the Executive power. John Adams, Jefferson, Madison,
and John Quincy Adams, in succession, found it necessary to voice opposition to
such encroachment. Succeeding Presidents also recognized the need and duty to
pass the Executive authority on to their successors unimpared by the adoption of
dangerous precedent.
About a year ago, you also found it necessary to disapprove an act of Congress which would have invaded the prerogatives of the executive branch of the
Federal Government. H. R. 7512, 83rd Congress, second session, related to an
agreement authorizing the Secretary of Defense to convey federally-owned lands
situated within the Camp Blanding Military Reservation, Florida, upon condition
that, prior to the consummation of such an agreement, the Secretary of Defense
or his designee "shall come into agreement with the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and of the House of Representatives concerning the terms of
such agreement." In your veto message to the House of Representatives 8 you
stated:
"The purpose of this clause is to vest in the Committees on Armed
Services of the Senate and House of Representatives power to approve
or disapprove any agreement which the Secretary of the Army proposes
to make with the State of Florida pursuant to section 2 (4). The practical effect would be to place the power to make such agreement jointly
in the Secretary of the Army and the members of the Committees on
Armed Services. In so doing, the bill would violate the fundamental
constitutional principal of separation of powers prescribed in articles
I and II of the Constitution which place the legislative power in the Congress and the executive power in the executive branch."
The views expressed in that message have force in the present situation.
Past Attorneys General also have consistently advised the executive branch
of the constitutional invalidity of legislative enactments which would destroy
the independence and integrity of the separate branches of the Government (see,
for example, 37 Op. A. G. 56).
7 WLIAmS. E. THE STATESMAN'S MANUAL, Vol.
8 100 CONG.REC. 7135 (1954).

1, App XVII.
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Another factor in the present situation requires consideration. Whenever a
provision in a statute is found invalid, question arises whether the whole act falls
or only the objectionable section. This depends on whether the unconstitutional
provision is separable from the rest of the act. In deciding that question, the courts
endeavor to ascertain from the terms of the act and its subject matter whether Congress would have intended the balance of the act to stand without the obnoxious
provision. 9
When H. R. 6042 passed the House of Representatives with Senate amendments on June 20, 1955, section 638 merely required a certification and report
by the Secretary of Defense to the Appropriations Committees of the Senate and
House of Representatives at least 60 days in advance of the disposal. As stated by
a member of the Senate, the purpose of section 638 as it then read was to give to
the two Appropriations Committees a "period in which to determine whether an
activity should be discontinued. The committee could not veto anything."' 10 This
view was confirmed by another Senator who stated: "We do not even have the
right of veto over the closing of the plant. All we ask is that the Secretary make
a report before he takes action. It seems to me that that would be in accordance
with sound precedents and would be in keeping with the interests of the country."1 1 The bill then went to conference with section 638 reading as indicated.
The present section 638 was added in the House of Representatives during
consideration of the conference report and was passed without consideration of
its constitutional implications. 12 The bill as thus amended was passed by the Sen13
ate without debate.
The multibillion dollar Defense Department Appropriation Act covers
many varied subjects bearing upon national defense. Section 638 is in the nature
of an addendum and does not bear upon the act as a whole or any other particular
portion of it. It is my opinion that the proviso which purports to vest disapproval
authority in either of the two Appropriations Committees is separable from the
remainder of the act and, if viewed as imposing an invalid condition, does not
affect the validity of the remaining provisions.
Respectfully,
(s) HERBERT BROWNELL, JR.
Attorney General
9 Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U. S. 286, 289 (1924).
10 101 CONG. REC. 7421 (1955).
11 Id. at 7422.
12 101 CONG. REc. 8216 - 8218 (1955).
13 Id. at 8154.

